This study of the firm under uncertainty relaxes the standard single production cycle assumption. Under realistic circumstances, a forward-looking risk-averse firm will produce more than a risk-neutral firm, and an increase in the mean-preserving price spread will increase the risk-averse firm's production. These results depend on firms realizing that the prices of inputs required for production in subsequent periods are correlated with the prices of current output.
Few studies have relaxed Sandmo's (1971) implicit assumption that the fum plans to end production at the end of the current period. However, this assumption is crucial for some of the most important results of the theory of the finn under uncertainty. As we show later, under certain realistic circumstances a forward-looking risk-averse fum will produce more than a risk-neutral one, and an increase in the mean-preserving price spread will increase the risk-averse fum's production.
There is at least one reason to expect the assumption of a single production cycle to matter.
Consider an industry for which input and output prices are positively correlated and fums remain in production for several production cycles. Here, the firm's end-of-period cash flow includes the costs required to initiate production in the subsequent period.! Therefore, the positive effect of high output prices may be expected to be offset by higher input prices. In addition, having output to sell, even if produced at a loss, can act as a hedge against input prices. Firms operating in this environment will be concerned about revenue and cost risks at several points in time and may choose to offset risk in one period against risk in another and will have an opporrunity to diversify risk across time.
Most of the existing literature on the topic assumes that fmns are concerned only with current period production and risk. But by assuming that firms behave myopically in this manner, the literature excludes by assumption the intertemporal diversification of risk that drives the results of this paper. Existing nonmyopic models have generally restricted utility to be intertemporally additive and prices to be independently distributed across time (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, Hey 1987 ). These are strong assumptions because intertemporal additivity implies perfect substirution among single-period utilities, and price independence is not supported by empirical research.
Other work exists upon which we can build. Zabel (1971) uses a constant absolute risk-averse intertemporal utility function but assumes intertemporal price independence. Chavas (1988) presents a forward-looking mean-variance model of speculative storage. However, using the mean-variance paradigm in this setting is difficult to justify because the random storage function has a truncated distribution.
In the next section, we introduce a forward-looking firm whose only productive activity is speculative storage (or asset holding). In this case, the correlation between input and output prices is most obvious and leads to a straightforward analysis of the finn's behavior. We also show that Sandmo-type behavior is nested within the more general model by restricting the finn to be myopic. Then, we allow the firm to be involved in a more standard productive activity and derive some propositions. The results for this more general case are derived at the cost of some additional assumptions about the technology set.
I. A Speculative Storing Competitive Firm
Consider a competitive finn with a twice continuously differentiable von NeumannMorgenstern utility function and assume that utility is strictly concave in its argument tenninal wealth [U(WT), U'(WT) > 0, U"(WT) < 0].2 Tenninal wealth is where w, denotes monetary wealth at end of trading date t, Jt, is cash flow at time t, and r, equals one plus the one-period interest rate prevailing at t Interest rate need not be constant over time, but it is restricted to be nonrandom. At each trading date 0 $ t < T the finn can borrow and lend unlimited amounts of money for one period at the prevailing interest rate.
It will become clear later that input price randomness plays a key role in the forwardlooking scenario, so that we want to account for it explicitly. But allowing for input price randomness renders the model intractable, as suggested by the related literarure (Batra and Ullah 2As noted by Katz (1983) . the proper argument of utility is wealth and not profits. although the larrer approach has been widely (and incorrectly) used. 1974 , Hartman 1975 , Ratti and Ullah 1976 , Wright 1984 , Stewart 1978 . One way to tackle this problem is to postulate a speculative firm whose only activity is storing a product (or asset) to profit from its resale. In this instance, the relevant cash flow at any date is represented by where P, represents the quantity sold at date t, p, denotes the price at t, i(·) is a convex storage cost function such that i'(-) > Q,3 and I, is beginning inventory at date t. Positive sales means that the firm sells from beginning stocks, whereas negative sales means that the finn buys to store and sell at a later date. Sales cannot exceed beginning inventory (i.e., P, :s; I,). The amount(~-P,) is the unsold beginning inventory at date t, which is carried over at nonrandom storage cost i(I,-P,) to become beginning inventory at timet+ 1 ~+ 1 ). This kind of cash flow reduces the problem to its essentials and is generalized later.
Assume that at any moment t the firm chooses current product sales (P ,) to maximize expected utility of tenninal wealth, given available information. The optimal sales level at the current date t = 0 is obtained by solving the following set of recursive equations where E,O denotes the expectation operator based on information available at t, P, = (p 0 , ••• , p,) is a vector containing past and current prices, and tenninal wealth and cash flows are given by (1.1) 3for a risk-averse flii11, i"(·) = 0 yields a bounded solution. This is import.'lnt bec:lUse i"(·) = 0 is a quite common situation in the real world (for example. gold and common stock are most likely carried over at constant marginal storage cost). In contr:lSt. for a risk-neutral flii11 we need i"(·) > 0 for the solution to be bounded. and (1.2), respectively. The solution to the problem summarized by expressions (1.3) and (1.4) can be obtained by recursively solving the Lagrangian functions where Tlr is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The first-order conditions (FOCs) corresponding to the tenninal date Tare (1.7)
(1.8) where MT' represents U' evaluated at the optimum. The first term of the derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to sales is positive, hence the Lagrangian multiplier (Th) is also positive to satisfy (1.7). Because TlT > 0, df.yldr\T must equal zero to avoid violating the KuhnTucker condition (1.8). Therefore, the optimal sales policy at Tis to liquidate the inventories (e.g., PT =IT), the optimal cash flow reduces to 7t-r = PT IT, and the value function is For all dates prior to the terminal date (0 :S: t < T), the FOCs are (see Appendix A): a£ (1.10) apt = rt+l ... rT·l [r, (p, + i') M(-Et(Pr+l Mt+l')]-Tlr = 0 t where Mt' = Et(Mt+ 1 ') evaluated at the optimum corresponding to date t (note that Mt' > 0). The solution to (1.10) and (1.11) is a unique absolute consrrained maximum because the objective function is strictly concave and the consrraint set is convex. 4 Expression (1.9) together with FOCs (1.10) and (1.11) provide the framework needed to analyze the forward-looking risk-averse fmn.
A myopic firm is defmed as one whose planning horizon is the same as its decision horizon, which is equal to one period.5 This defmition of myopia leaves two possibilities: the firm is either at tenninal date T, or at time T-1. At T the fmn faces no risk; therefore, we focus on the behavior of the myopic fmn at date T-1. In concrast, a forward-looking (or nonrnyopic) fmn is characterized by a planning horizon that consists of at least two decision horizons. This means that a forward-looking fmn is one optimizing at any date before T-1.
Because we will compare the risk-averse firm with an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm, we need to know the optimal behavior of the latter. It is straightforward to show that the riskneutral FOCs for any date preceding the tenninal timeT are and that the optimal sales policy at Tis given by PT = Iy (see Appendix B). It follows immediately from (1.12) and (1.13) that, in the risk-neutral context, optimal myopic and forward-looking sales are identical, therefore we will not distinguish between myopic and nonmyopic risk-neutral behavior. 4 We will assume for the remainder of the analysis that the solution to (1.3) and (1.4) exists. The conditions for this are given in Beruekas (1976, p. 375) .
5 According to Menon (1982, p. 656) , the planning horizon "is the maximum length of time for which the investor gives any weight in his utility function," and the decision horizon is "the length of time between which the investor makes successive decisions. and is the minimum time between which he would take any action."
II. Myopic versus Forward-Looking Speculative Storage Behavior
We can obtain comparative statics corresponding to the risk-averse finn by total differentiation of FOCs (1.10) and (1.11). The myopic and forward-looking responses of sales and storage to current price, beginning inventories, the degree of absolute risk aversion, the interest rate, and the parameters of the distribution of next-date price are summarized in Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. Note that we use the acronyms CARA, DARA, and IARA to denote constant, decreasing, and increasing absolute risk aversion, respectively. Proof" See Appendix C.
Because storage (! 1 ) is the "productive" activity of this speculative fum, Proposition 1 reiterates the findings of the standard literature on the firm under uncertainty for the case of speculative storage. If the myopic firm is DARA or CARA, storage increases with higher expected price or smaller Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving price spreacL Also, myopic storage is negatively related to the flrm's degree of absolute risk aversion.
From Proposition 1, beginning stocks have a positive (negative) effect on storage if the firm is DARA (lARA). This result is to be expected: a ceteris paribus increase in beginning stocks makes the firm wealthier and therefore less absolute risk averse if DARA. But we know that storage is negatively associated to the degree of absolute risk aversion, so that storage grows when beginning stocks increase for a DARA firm. The ambiguous response to current price in Proposition 1 seems counterintuitive. One would expect current price to affect storage negatively because current price may be considered an input price for storage. But a current price change also causes a wealth change and, consequently, a change in the degree of absolute risk aversion unless the fum is CARA. For the CARA firm, the degree of absolute risk aversion does not depend on current price and the storage response to current price is unambiguously negative. Also, the DARA fum that buys good to store (i.e., P 0 :;; 0) reduces storage as current price increases. Otherwise, DARA storage bears an ambiguous relationship with current price. A similar explanation can be given to the result regarding the interest rate in Proposition 1.
When the fum is CARA the degree of absolute risk aversion is not affected by changes in exogenous variables. Therefore, the CARA firm's response to a change in a specific exogenous variable does not include the indirect effect of that variable on the degree of absolute risk aversion.
For non-CARA fJTITIS, this indirect effect may be of opposite direction and sufficiently large so as to outweigh the exogenous variable direct effect, which is the reason for the ambiguities that arise from DARA or lARA attitudes in Proposition 1. Because of these ambiguities, non-CARA forward-looking behavior cannot be characterized without imposing more restrictions (see Proposition 2). 
Proof" See Appendix C.
When we constrain the forward-looking finn to be CARA, we obtain unambiguous responses to current price, interest rate, and beginning inventory. Moreover, these responses are qualitatively the same as for the myopic CARA finn. But the effect of next-date expected price, next-date Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving price spread, and the coefficient of absolute risk aversion on forward-looking sales and storage are ambiguous even for CARA. This result is counterintuitive and stands in contrast with what was found for the myopic case. This finding merits a more careful analysis because it challenges some of the main conclusions of the standard theory of the competitive finn under uncertainty.
We can show that the ambiguous forward-looking response is a plausible characterization of real-world finn behavior. To explain this behavior, it is helpful to rewrite FOC (1.10) in terms of the covariance between prices and marginal utility. 6 If the finn stores something at the present date (e.g., 1 1 = I 0 -P 0 > 0), the Lagrangian multiplier must equal zero (T] 0 = 0) and we can express (1.10) as
On the other hand, if the firm stores nothing (! 1 = Io-P 0 = 0), the Lagrangian multiplier is positive Cllo <: 0), and instead of (2. Proof" The risk-neutral reservation price is fu:r = E 0 (p 1 )/r 0 -i'(O); the proof is trivial from FOCs (1.12) and (1.13).
For a myopic flnn, I 2 = Ir +I = 0, and the right-hand side of (2.3) reduces to Ir Mr" ::; 0. Therefore,
because Pr is monotonically increasing in Pr-and Mr' is monotonically n?nincreasing in Applying expression (2.5) to (2.1) and (2.2) we get Hence, the myopic risk-averse reservation price is P;;:,r.J = E 0 (p 1 )/r 0 -i'(O) = P~r- Hardy, Littlewood. and P6lya (1967) .
(2) If che firm is CARA and prices behave as shown in expression (2.4 ), chen rhe forwardlooking reservation price is higher chan che risk-neutral or che myopic risk-averse reservation price.
Proof: We will only show part (2) Our results hold not only in the unrealistic case of independent prices (i.e., [3 = 0) but also in the realistic cases of random walk ([3 = l) and stationary autoregressive processes of order 1 (0 < ~ < 1). Moreover, the price behavior assumed [i.e., expression (2.4)] can be easily relaxed and still obtain the main results of Proposition 4 and its Corollary, i.e., that there exists a range of current prices over which the forward-looking CARA fum stores more than the risk-neutral fum stores. In the interest of space, however, we will not pursue further the characterization of price processes that lead to the main results of Proposition 4 and its Corollary.
In passing, it is worth noting that in the forward-looking scenario we cannot use normally distributed prices to justify mean-variance analysis because terminal beginning inventory is random but not normally distributed. From Proposition 3, it follows that IT= 0 when the current price is greater than the myopic reservation price [i.e., when PT. 1 > E.r. 1 (pT)/rT. 1 -i'(O)]. This result truncates the density function of tenninal wealth, making it a non-normal density.
In Figures 1 and 2 , we illustrate ihe key findings reported in Propositions 1 through 4. 
<-p=
1 where lxl represents the absolute value of x, and the superscripts CARA and rn stand for CARA and risk-neutral finns, respectively.
As stated in Proposition 3, the risk-neutral and myopic CARA reservation prices are identical in Figures 1 and 2 . Also, risk-neutral storage is always above myopic CARA storage. that the forward-looking CARA reservation price is greater than the risk-neutral reservation price.
Because storage curves are negatively sloped, the forward-looking CARA firm stores more than a risk-neutral firm when current price is between the risk-neutral and the forward-looking reservation
. tl pnces 1.e., O<T-1 > --o<r = 1 PO<r. 1 >Po > PO<T . 1 oreover, 1 storage cost IS a smc y convex function (as depicted), forward-looking CARA storage will also exceed risk-neutral storage for some range of current prices less than the risk-neutral reservation price (i.e., I~~ > I~:T > 0 for some Po< P~r).
When current price is between the forward-looking CARA and the risk-neutral reservation prices, we observe a decrease in forward-looking CAR..<\ storage as we reduce the coefficient of absolute risk aversion from some posi:ive value to zero (i.e., as firms become risk neutral). This is the reason why forward-looking CARA storage may increase with the degree of absolute risk aversion. We can apply a similar reasoning to explain the ambiguous effect of next-date expected price and next-date Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving spread on forward-looking CARA storage.
From the proof of Proposition 4, it is clear that if current storage is sufficiently high we will have Cov(p 1 , M 1 ') < 0 because the first term in the right-hand side of (2.3) will outweigh the other terms. Therefore, for sufficiently large current storage, we will have risk-neutral storage exceeding forward-looking CARA storage. Also, because of inequality (2.8), the forward-looking and risk-neutral curves intersect at a unique point These observations are illustrated in Figure 1 .
We can readily explain the apparent irrationality of a nonmyopic CARA fum holding inventories when current price is greater than discounted expected next-date price minus storage cost Let lo· t 1 , and tz be three arbitrary successive calendar times, and write the tenninal cash flow at dates to and t 1 in the following way:
At time lo· the planning horizon for the myopic firm ends at next date t 1 , so that T = t 1 • The myopic firm at date T-1 = 1o plans to sell its entire current storage at date T = t 1
• Therefore, at time 1o the myopic fum only cares about revenue risk at t 1 (i.e., p, I, ). In contrast, the forward- )] in addition to revenue risk from its activities at t 1 . But revenue and input cost risks are related to each other and to current storage. In particular, current storage increases revenue: risk but reduces input cost risk. The two opposing effects of current storage mean that the forward-looking fum may derive utility from holding some inventory, even when the one-period expected return from storage is negative. In a sense, the forward-looking fum diversifies assets interti:mporall y.
The results in this section apply not only to fums speculating with commodity storage, but also to speculative holders of stocks, bonds, and other non transformable assets. These results are compatible with the findings of the standard theory of the firm under uncertainty because the standard results apply when the forward-looking firm stores a sufficiently large amount. But our model explains real-world facts that are incompatible with the standard model of the fum under uncertainty. For example, firms practice sequential marketing hold output and/or input reserves, and spread transactions over time to reduce risk (Robison and Barry, 1987, p. 65) .
To illustrate the preceding findings, consider the following example. Assume that the forward-looking CARA firm is at decision date T-2, which corresponds to calendar time to· Prices at calendar times t 1 and tz (i.e., decision dates T-1 and T, respectively) have the following stationary discrete distribution: { 13 with probability 0.25 (2.10) p, = 10 with probability 0.50 7 with probability 0.25
Therefore, Eto(p, In addition, assume that the firm has no beginning inventories (I'o = 0) and that the interest rate is zero (i.e., r'D = r 11 = !).
The utility-maximizing storage level was obtained by numerical maximization of the expected value of utility. 8 Table 1 and Figures 3 through 5 summarize the key results. It can be observed in Table I that the forward-looking CARA reservation price is above the myopic CARA and the risk-neutral reservation prices. Also, forward-looking CARA optimum storage equals 35.48 units when the current price is p'D = 9 (i.e., the myopic CARA reservation price). The expected profit from storing 35.48 units from date to to date t 1 is -1.3 (i.e., a loss of 1.3).
However, the forward-looking CARA expected utility at 1 1 = 35.48 equals -0.92875, which is I greater than the expected utility at 1 11 = 0 (expected utility in this instance is -I). The intuition for this result can be found in Figure 3 , which shows the probability distribution of wealth at date 1:2 for the forward-looking and myopic CARA firms, assuming that the current price is p'D = 9.9
Given this current price, the myopic finn stores nothing at to· When date t 1 arrives, if the myopic firm stays in business until date t, it will store when p 1 = 7 (a 0.25 probability), and it will not -I store when p 1 = 10 or 13 (a 0.75 probability). If the myopic firm stores at tl' there are three 1 possible wealth outcomes: (i) a profit of 1,514 if p 12 = 13, which has a 0.0625 (0.25 x 0.25) unconditional probability; (ii) a profit of 543 if p 12 = 10 (a 0.125 unconditional probability); and (iii) a loss of 429 if p 12 = 7 (a 0.0625 unconditional probability). In contrast, the forward-looking firm stores 35.48 units at to and behaves myopically at t 1 • Therefore, there are five possible wealth outcomes. The most likely outcome is a loss of 1.3 (a 0.5 probability), which occurs when p 1 = 10. There is also a 0.25 probability that the firm will make a profit of 105 (when p 1 = 13).
I I
Finally, if p, 1 = 7 (a 0.25 probability), the forward-looking firm will lose 108 on its to storage but Swe used the utility function U =-exp(-A. Wy) so that utility values range between -I and 0.
9To obtain the disnibution of wealth at date ~·we assumed that all three fums behave myopically m date t 1 and that they store nothing at date 1:.· 
Coefficient of absolute risk aversion Figure 5 . Effect of coefficient of absolute risk aversion on optimal forward-looking CARA storage, assuming that current price is Pro = 9 · it will store at tl' which may yield high or medium profits or a loss. The data in Figure 3 reveal that average wealth at~ is slightly lower for the forward-looking CARA compared to the myopic CARA fl.rm, but the standard deviation for the latter is considerably higher than for the former. Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the mean-preserving price spread at date t 1 and the optimal forward-looking CARA storage.IO The simulation shows the ambiguous effect of risk on storage. When p'o = 7, the firm expects to profit from storage and its response to risk is negative up to a mean-preserving spread of 4.5, i.e., it behaves like a myopic finn. The positive response to risk when the mean-preserving spread increases beyond 4.5 occurs because, by storing more from to to tl' the firm can take advantage of a high t 1 price. This advantage is not symmetrically offset by the losses resulting from a low p, because a low t 1 price creates profit 1 opportunities to store from t 1 to ~ (remember that the mean-preserving price spread change occurs only at t 1 prices, which means that the~ price vector is 13, 10, and 7). When the to price is 9, the forward-looking firm stores more as risk increases up to a mean-preserving price spread of 9 and stores less thereafter. By increasing storage in response to an increase in the mean-preserving price spread, the finn effectively reduces the standard deviation of wealth at t.., compared to the siruation in which storage is either unchanged or reduced (see Figure 3) . This example provides intuition for the positive correlation between storage and risk.
Finally, Figure 5 shows that storage bears an ambiguous relationship to the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Risk-neutral finns store nothing at p, = 9. If we introduce a small degree 0 of risk aversion, then storage is optimal because it reduces the variance of terminal wealth (and reduces expected terminal wealth as well). However, there is a point at which additional storage increases risk; beyond this point, increased absolute risk aversion reduces storage in the traditional manner.
!Of-or example, a me:m-preserving price spread of x units implies that p, equals (10 + x) with probability 1 0.25, 10 with probability 0.50. and (10-x) with probability 0.25.
III. The Case of a Productive Competitive Firm
The main results discussed in the preceding section were obtained by assuming the cash flow presented in (1.2) and are attributable to the contemporaneous relationship between revenue and input cost at each date. In this section, we will show that similar conclusions apply to fums characterized by less restrictive cash flows. The complications that arise from allowing for random input prices in a nonmyopic context are attributable to the possibilities of stochastic production and/or input substitution. Hence, we can apply our basic model to other types of cash flows by constraining the production function to be nonstochastic and such that inputs with random prices cannot be substituted.
Consider a competitive fum with a Leontief shan-run production function, where Q, denotes output at date t, Q, :<: 0, 0: represents material input use, <1> is a fixed inputoutput coefficient (<1> > 0), v, is a vector of nonmaterial inputs, and q(·) is a concave production function. Output Q, becomes available for sale at date t+ 1, i.e., the production process starts at time t but output cannot be sold until date t+ L According to (3.1), adding <1> units of material input increases production by one unit over the range in which the vector of nonmaterial inputs does not constrain production. If enough units of material input are added, the set of nonmaterial inputs eventually becomes binding and production cannot increase. The fact that there is no substitutability between material input and q(·) does not mean that substitution among the nonmaterial inputs in vector V, is prevented. For example, it may be feasible to substitute capital for labor in wheat milling, even though the substitutability of wheat for either of these rwo nonmaterial inputs combined or alone is negligible for all practical purposes. Note also that material input becomes nonbinding as <1> tends to zero, resulting in a standard production function q(·). In other words, the standard production function is nested in (3.1).
For our purposes, it is essential that the Leontief function (3.1) is nonstochastic and that there is no substitution between material and nonmaterial inputs. This allows us to examine the situation for which material input price is random without complications arising from input substitution or stochastic output. Storage, transportation, refining and/or purifying of raw materials (e.g., oil, sugar, and metals), grain milling (e.g., wheat and rice), oilseed crushing, alloy preparation, energy generation, meat packing, and livestock production are examples of processes that comply with this type of production function. Diewert (1971) has shown that the cost function dual to (3.1) is where C is variable cost, s, is material input price, c(-) is a convex nonmaterial cost function such that c'O > 0, and v, is a vector of nonmaterial input prices. We will assume that nonmaterial input prices are constant, and we will simply write c(Q,) instead of c(Q,; v,) because we will not be concerned with nonmaterial input prices. Assuming that material input price is stochastic while nonmaterial input prices are constant can be justified because in many siruations the largest share of variable cost is due to the material input. In addition, nonmaterial input prices are generally less volatile, and substitutability among nonmaterial inputs should cause variable cost changes far less pronounced than those due to material input price changes. Hence, the cash flow corresponding to a nonstoring firm with the Leontiefproduction function (3.1) can be represented by Comparing (3.3) with (1.2) reveals that the latter is a special case of the former, in which <l> = 1, s, = p,, and I,+ 1 = Q, = 0:1<1>.
With random fmal product and material input prices, optimal production at the current date t The intuition for Propositions 5 and 6 is the same as that for the speculative storing firm.
Again, our findings extend and qualify the standard results of the firm under uncenainty. For example, Proposition 6 explains the observed fact that in many instances firms continue producing even if they expect not to recover their variable costs over shan periods of time.
The key to the behavioral hypotheses derived for the forward-looking CARA finn is the positive contemporaneous relationship between output and materiill input prices. The obvious question that arises is how strong and of what sign is that relationship in real-world situations. To this end, we repon in Table 2 the correlation coefficients for seven pairs of contemporaneous output and material input prices belonging to the U.S. agricultural marketing and farm sectors. It can be seen that in all cases output and input prices bear a positive relationship. Table 2 also shows that the output-material input price relationship may be too strong to be neglected a priori when analyzing the firm under uncenainty.
Our results have implications for empirical work. First, the usual technique of a priori restricting the finn's production response to risk to be of the same sign at all production levels may be inappropriate. In fact, doing so may bias empirical results toward rejection of the hypothesis that risk affects finn behavior. This observation is supponed by empirical studies reponing that output price variance has a relatively low impact on production (e.g., Brorsen et aL 1985 , Antonovitz and Roe 1986 , Aradhyula and Holt 1989 , Antonovitz and Green 1990 , and that material input price has a relatively greater effect on production than does the expected output price (e.g., Antonovitz and Roe, Antonovitz and Green). Second, relaxing the myopic constraint seems relevant, given the recent developments toward allowing for both rational expectations and risk aversion (Aradhyula and Holt, Antonovitz and Green) . Even though forward-looking behavior is not synonymous to rational expectations, the concept of rational expectations seems much more consistent with forward-looking than with myopic behavior.
Our fmdings are also relevant for the study of business cycles. Forward-looking CARA firms tend to produce less than do risk-neutral ones at high output levels but more at low levels of production. Forward-looking CARA firms will therefore dampen the effects of business cycles. Corn: Prices calculated from the hog-<:orn ratio (VIeimar and Cromer 1990).
Broiler grower feed: Prices paid by farmers (VIeimar and Cromer 1990).
IV. Conclusions
A well-known result from the theory of the flnn under uncertainty is that a myopic riskaverse fum produces less than does an otherwise identical risk-neutral flrm. Our analysis reveals, however, that this conclusion is due to the assumption of myopic behavior and/or lack of correlation between output and material input prices. If output and material input prices are contemporaneously correlated, a risk-averse forward-looking firm may produce more or less than will a risk-neutral fum.
We show that there are realistic circumstances under which the forward-looking constant absolute risk-averse (CARA) fum will produce more than will a risk-neutral fum. In such instances, forward-looking CARA production exceeds risk-neutral output at low levels of ·-production and the opposite is true at high production levels.
The behavioral differences between myopic risk-averse and forward-looking CARA firms are attributable to the fact that the former cares only about revenue risk, whereas the latter is concerned about both revenue and input cost risks. The myopic flnn acts as if it intends to exit the market at the end of the current cycle and therefore disregards future costs. For such a flrm, the only risk effect of production is to increase revenue risk. In contrast, the forward-looking fum plans to stay in the market after the current production cycle and therefore it takes into account furure costs. Hence, for the forward-looking firm, current production not only increases revenue risk but also lowers cost risk if output and material input prices are positively related. Therefore, the forward-looking CARA firm may be willing to produce even if the one-period expected return from doing so is negative.
The model introduced in this paper provides a rationale for stylized facts in microeconomics. For example, it explains why firms continue producing (or storing) in the shon run even at an expected loss and why farmers spread sales over time as a means to reduce risk.
Our findings may also explain why empirical studies have found that the variance of output price has a relatively small impact on production. For myopic firms, we have date 0 = T-1 and P 1 =IT= I 
